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Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy*
P. D. Magnus and Craig Callenderyz

The no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are arguably the main considerations for and against scientific realism. Recently these arguments have been accused of
embodying a familiar, seductive fallacy. In each case, we are tricked by a base rate fallacy,
one much-discussed in the psychological literature. In this paper we consider this accusation
and use it as an explanation for why the two most prominent ‘wholesale’ arguments in the
literature seem irresolvable. Framed probabilistically, we can see very clearly why realists
and anti-realists have been talking past one another. We then formulate a dilemma for
advocates of either argument, answer potential objections to our criticism, discuss what
remains (if anything) of these two major arguments, and then speculate about a future
philosophy of science freed from these two arguments. In so doing, we connect the point
about base rates to the wholesale/retail distinction; we believe it hints at an answer of how to
distinguish profitable from unprofitable realism debates. In short, we offer a probabilistic
analysis of the feeling of ennui afflicting contemporary philosophy of science.

1. Introduction. A recently fashionable claim in philosophy of science is
that the realism/anti-realism debate ought to be dissolved rather
than solved. There is a feeling that the debate is not entirely well-formed,
that the disputants are speaking past one another. Motivating this view,
Blackburn writes:
The issue of realism. . .is apt to prompt a particularly acute gestaltswitch. On the one hand it seems absurd, a Berkeleian folly, to
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question the reality of the objects of common-sense, of core scientific
theory. On the other hand realism is often seen as demanding the
mythical God’s eye view, whereby we step out of our own skins, and
comment on the extent to which our best scientific theory corresponds with an independent reality. . . . In the one view realism seems
almost indisputably true, and in another equally obviously false or
undiscussable. So there is every opening for debates in which each
side talks past each other. (2002, 112)
He then argues that, when clearly stated, a ‘‘surprising ‘quietism’ or pessimism about a metatheoretical position begins to seem attractive’’ (2002,
111). In explaining the success of some piece of science, there is no
‘‘getting behind the explanation,’’ he writes; the best explanation for the
success of the hypothesis that the world is round is that the world is round.
There is no ‘‘further set of data about science (its success) that required
something like an independent, sideways explanation’’ (2002, 130). Maddy
draws a similar conclusion, urging that we not ‘‘add extra-scientific standards of justification to our repertoire’’ (2001, 47–48). Adding these extrascientific standards yields nothing but dead-end debates over realism.
Though distinct, Maddy and Blackburn’s positions are both descendants
of Fine’s well-known attempt to dissolve the realism debate (1984).
The issue may be clarified by distinguishing what we call retail arguments for realism (arguments about specific kinds of things such as neutrinos, for instance) from wholesale arguments (arguments about all or
most of the entities posited in our best scientific theories). Wholesale
arguments promise a conclusion that applies to all mature science.
Wholesale realism seeks to explain the success of science in general;
wholesale anti-realism seeks to explain the history of science in general.
Dissolving the debate, we suggest, involves attending to the retail arguments without trying to settle the debate in an all-or-nothing, wholesale
manner. Dissolvers want us to answer the question, ‘Are there atoms?,’ by
referring to the same evidence scientists use to support the atomic hypothesis; e.g., Einstein and Smoluchowski’s Brownian motion theory and
the experiments by Perrin in 1908. But they do not want us to answer by
appealing to this as an instance of a more general claim, namely, that the
theory and experiment of Einstein, Smoluchowski, and Perrin are part of a
mature science and the posits of mature science are generally true. We
sympathize with potential dissolvers of the realism debate, inasmuch as it
concerns wholesale arguments. However, the exact reasons for being a
dissolver are often unclear. Why exactly are questions like ‘What explains
the reliability and success of science?’ taboo? That it remains unsolved is
not a sufficient reason to think that a philosophical problem is illegitimate
or even insoluble. We ask and answer plenty of similar questions: ‘Is this
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mathematical modeling technique reliable?’ ‘What explains the success of
bright silver fishing lures?’ ‘Is the eye generally reliable?’ One is left
wondering when to solve and when to dissolve.
Here we are concerned to provide a clear reason for believing that the
wholesale realism debate should be dissolved, a reason that does not rely
on contentious claims about the nature of truth, the status of normative
epistemology, and what-have-you.1 We hope that our analysis explains
what dissolvers find objectionable—that some debates about scientific
realism amount to adamant, futile table thumping—without the baggage of
some of their epistemological analyses. We do this by considering the two
most powerful wholesale arguments in the literature, the no-miracles argument for scientific realism and the pessimistic induction for anti-realism.
The former has been dubbed the ‘‘ultimate argument’’ for realism, and antirealists from Duhem through Laudan have relied primarily on the latter.
Worrall (1989) recently billed these two arguments as the main considerations for and against realism. They pull in opposite directions with
comparable, perhaps even balanced, force. Yet Colin Howson and Peter
Lewis have independently suggested that these arguments embody a familiar, seductive fallacy. Howson (2000, 52–54) makes the point about the
no-miracles argument;2 Lewis (2001) about the pessimistic induction. Interestingly, neither applies the point to both arguments. With each argument we are tricked by a base rate fallacy. If this is correct and the intuitions
marshaled by argument are phantoms of that fallacy, then there is much
sound and fury in debates over realism that signifies nothing.
In this paper we appeal to the arguments of Howson and Lewis and use
them as part of an explanation for why the two most prominent wholesale
arguments in the literature seem irresolvable. Though the formal reconstruction of these arguments is artificial in various respects, reconstructing
the arguments this way allows us to see a crucial flaw in both. In particular,
framed as Howson and Lewis would have it, we can see very clearly why
realists and anti-realists have been talking past one another. We then
formulate a dilemma for advocates of either argument, answer potential
objections to our criticism, discuss what remains (if anything) of these
two major arguments, and then speculate about a future philosophy of
science freed of these two arguments. In so doing, we connect the point
about base rates to the wholesale/retail distinction; we believe it hints at
an answer of how to distinguish profitable from unprofitable realism
debates. In short, we offer a probabilistic analysis of the feeling of ennui
afflicting contemporary philosophy of science.

1. See Psillos (1999) for criticisms of Fine on these points.
2. Howson’s attention was drawn to the fallacy by Korb 1991.
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2. The No-Miracles Argument. Some scientific theories are astonishingly successful. Classical thermodynamics has made correct predictions
about all manner of substance for almost two centuries; meanwhile,
quantum electrodynamics successfully predicts an electron’s magnetic
moment to more than one part in a billion. The no-miracles argument
claims that if these theories did not latch on to the world in some way—that
is, if they were not approximately true—then this success would be
nothing short of miraculous. Some theories are too good not to be true.
The argument might be formalized in this way: For any theory x, let Sx
stand for the expression ‘x is successful’ and let Tx stand for the expression
‘x is true.’ Let :A be the negation of A and let Pr(A|B) be the probability of
A conditional on B. We may now gloss the argument in this way for some
current theory: [1] The theory h is very likely successful. [2] If h were true,
it would be very likely to be successful. [3] If h were false, it would not be
likely to be successful. [4] Therefore, there is a high probability that h is
true. Formalizing this version of the argument yields:
PrðShÞ 3 0

ð1Þ

PrðShjThÞ 3 0

ð2Þ

PrðShj:ThÞT1

ð3Þ

) PrðThjShÞ 3 0

ð4Þ

For instance, assume the values .9, .95, and .05 for Pr(Sh), Pr(Sh|Th),
and Pr(Sh|:Th) respectively; then, Pr(Th|Sh) = .997. The reconstruction is
crude, but it is sufficient to frame much of the action surrounding nomiracles reasoning. One can, as Howson (2000, 45) does, complain that it
is silly to think that there is a well-defined outcome space, probability
distribution, etc. We sympathize but do not want to decide the matter on a
technicality. One can also, as Howson does, point out that ‘gruesome’
hypotheses short circuit the argument, for there are an infinity of these
that will make the same predictions as our successful theories. But we
don’t think most realists see the no-miracles argument as solving the
problem of induction; rightly or wrongly, that problem is being bracketed
here (assumed ‘solved’ or ‘unresolvable’). The crux of the debate then
becomes assessing—often in a qualitative way—the relevant probabilities. Many anti-realists have directed their objections at forms of (3).
Larry Laudan, for instance, notes that many past theories which were
successful proved in the fullness of time not to be true; in effect, Laudan
is chipping away at (3), recommending a higher value for Pr(Sh|:Th) by
considering the history of science.

324

p. d. magnus and craig callender

3. The Pessimistic Induction. Reflections on the history of science motivate the anti-realist argument. Considering past theories, we observe that
many once successful theories are now believed to be false, e.g., caloric
theory. We sample the successful theories of the past and find that many
or most of them were false. We generalize and, by induction on these
cases, evaluate Pr(:Tx|Sx) as being rather high for an arbitrary theory x.
This holds for our present successful theories; hence we should think that
they, too, will turn out to be false.3 Contemporary discussions of this
argument begin with Laudan (1981), who writes:
I daresay that for every highly successful theory in the past of science
which we now believe to be a genuinely referring theory, one could
find half a dozen once successful theories which we now regard as
substantially non-referring. (1981, 35)
If Laudan can show that Prð:ThjShÞ ¼ 67, then—on the further assumption that Pr(Sh) =1—it follows that PrðThÞ ¼ 17. This is the pessimistic
induction. It invites us to conclude that the probability of some present,
successful theory being true is rather low.4
4. The Fallacy. To see the point clearly, consider a case removed from
the giddy heights of realism. Suppose that there is some disease that in
the course of time inevitably produces unique and readily identifiable
symptoms. Imagine that there is some reliable test for this disease that can
identify people infected with it who have not yet developed symptoms.
Let Dx stand for ‘x has the disease’ and let Px stand for ‘x tests positive
for the disease.’ Now suppose that if someone has the disease, then they
are sure to test positive; that is, assume Pr(Px|Dx) = 1. Suppose further
that if someone is not infected there is some small chance that they will
nonetheless test positive; that is, there is a chance that a positive test result
will be a false positive. (In the language of significance tests, a false
positive is a Type II error.) Let that chance of a false positive be five
3. One referee suggests limiting the induction to fundamental theories, since all of which
but the present ones are known to be false. However, it is not clear which theories are
fundamental. Is quantum field theory fundamental? Looking at problems with renormalization, many think not. Then of course there is the question of its compatibility with general
relativity. Also, which theories are considered fundamental may change with time. Thermodynamics, devised under a caloric interpretation, might have been fundamental; and later,
under an energist interpretation like that Ostwald’s might have been fundamental again. Yet
today it is clearly not fundamental. The restriction to fundamental theories thus runs the
danger of limiting the induction base to nil.
4. The argument is sometimes called a metainduction, since it generalizes over past inductive inferences, but of course the sample includes past scientific inferences whether
inductive or otherwise.
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percent, i.e. Pr(Px|:Dx) = .05. Now suppose a patient a tests positive for
the disease. What is the probability that she actually has it?
It is tempting to say that Pr(Da|Pa) = .95 or at least to assign a high
value to Pr(Da|Pa). We can construct the inference so as to be formally
analogous to the no-miracles argument as we formulated it above: From
Pr(Pa) = 1, Pr(Pa|Da) = 1, Pr(Pa|:Da) = .05, infer Pr(Da|Pa) 3 0. As
any elementary statistics text will remind us, however, we must consider
the sample from which this patient was drawn. Suppose, among the
people tested, the disease is rare. If only 1 in 1000 people has the disease,
then given the assumptions above we should expect about 51 in 1000 to
test positive. Of those 51 who test positive, only 1 will actually have the
disease. Thus, the chance that this patient who tests positive has the
disease would be 1 in 51; Pr(Da|Pa) = .02. Thinking that Pr(Da|Pa) must
be rather high is the false positives fallacy, a form of base rate neglect.5
Now return to the no-miracles argument. Setting worries about (3)
aside, there is an additional premise hidden in this formulation of the
argument: h is, by stipulation, some current theory of a mature science.
Let H be the set of present candidate theories. Now the no-miracles
argument takes this form for all x:
PrðSxj x2 HÞ 3 0

ð5Þ

PrðSxjTx & x 2 HÞ 3 0

ð6Þ

PrðSxj:Tx & x2 HÞT1

ð7Þ

) PrðTxjSx & x 2 HÞ 3 0

ð8Þ

The argument revised in this way is still valid, but its soundness should
tug less at our intuitions. Premise (5) will hold only if any arbitrary
member of the population is likely to be successful. On the assumption
that success is a reliable indicator of truth, this is tantamount to assuming
that any arbitrary member of the population is likely to be true. If
PrðTx|x 2HÞ is low (and how can we know if it is not?), then (5) fails and
the conclusion does not follow.
We might attempt to assess (5) by inspecting the pool of theories, H.
We defined H as the set of candidate theories, but what theories were
candidates for our present mature sciences? It is impossible to count up or
even fairly sample all the theories that were considered for our mature
sciences, and so it is impossible to evaluate whether (5) obtains.

5. The argument for Pr(Da|Pa) 3 0 fails because the assumption Pr(Pa) = 1 is not true
given this population.
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The realist may insist that H is the set of theories actually professed by
our mature sciences and, thus, that we can assess (5) in a straightforward
way: sample the overt declarations of mature sciences and check their
success. Yet this would be a biased sample, since theories in mature sciences were chosen (in no small part) because they were successful. Any
theory x 2H would probably be successful, just on account of its membership in H. Thus, (6) would hold trivially and not on account of any
connection between success and truth; (7) would simply be false, since
almost all x2H would be successful, whether true or not. The realist would
thus avoid base rate neglect, but at the cost of sample selection bias.
Suppose realists win the point that success-to-truth inference is reliable,
even that it is as reliable as our hypothetical diagnostic test. If true theories are rare enough—that is, if PrðTx|x2 HÞT1—then Pr(Tx|Sx) may
be very low indeed. The no-miracles argument turns on neglecting this
base rate.
The same goes for the pessimistic induction. The anti-realist hoped to
show Pr(:Th|Sh) 3 0 on the basis of the historical record. Mindful of
base rates, we should be careful to include the sample population explicitly in formulating the argument. Let the set of past scientific hypotheses be Hp . Suppose that historical enquiry does show that, for an
arbitrary member of Hp , Prð:Tx|SxÞ ¼ 67; that is, suppose that
Prð:TxjSx & x2Hp Þ ¼

6
:
7

ð9Þ

If (9) were true, it would not have a direct bearing on the reliability of
the success-to-truth inference as expressed in Pr(Th|Sh). Past successful
theories might typically be false because most successful theories are
false (Pr(:Tx|Sx) 3 0), but they might typically be false instead because
most past theories were false ðPrðTx|x2Hp ÞT1Þ.6 If the latter, then the
realist may insist that the population of past theories Hp was a different
kettle of fish than the population of present theories H. On that assumption, (9) is compatible with the realists’ desire to infer truth from the
success of present theories, expressed as (8).
Pressing the point against the realist directly would require showing
that the proportion of true to false theories is now about the same as it has
always been; i.e. that
PrðTxj x2HÞ  PrðTxj x2 Hp Þ:
6. Of course, (9) could also be explained by some interaction of these two factors.

ð10Þ
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The realist will contest (10), of course, and insist that the PrðTx|x 2Hi Þ
increases through history. The anti-realist will probably deny that we have
any way of evaluating (10), since evaluating it would presume we could
determine matters of truth. Lewis suggests how a new induction might
address this problem:
Given that past theories are not automatically successful, the only
way to ascertain whether the history of science supports convergent
realism or undermines it would be to conduct a thorough survey of
past theories, true and false, successful and unsuccessful. A moment’s
reflection on the difficulties of such a survey perhaps indicates why
nothing like it has been attempted. (2001, 379)
Indeed, it is unlikely that there is any neutral way to count up past
theories. Mindful of change over time and inter-personal variation, how
many theories of Newtonian mechanics were there?
We can now offer a diagnosis of the feeling of futility in the realism
debates. By pointing to apparently successful but false theories, anti-realists
responding to the no-miracles argument seek to increase Pr(:Th|Sh). By
restricting the pool of theories under consideration to those that meet
various strict conditions like maturity, novelty, and so on, realists responding to the pessimistic induction seek to lower the value for Pr(Sx|:Th).
(That is, they are essentially replacing S with new, more stringent
conceptions of success, S*.) One is working on the likelihood, the other
on the probability. Cases might shift the above probabilities/likelihoods,
but it won’t matter all that much. It won’t matter that much because
to connect the likelihood with the probability there is a third crucial ingredient, the base rates of S and T in the population, and these aren’t talked
about—for good reason.
5. A Dilemma. Perhaps the most natural counter-argument is to suppose
that the base rates or priors are determined in some way. Let’s consider
whether this might be so. In the case of our imagined disease, the problem
of false positives need not undermine the usefulness of the test. If some
group has been exposed to the disease, we might have good reason to think
that many of them have it—for instance if the disease is highly contagious
and all members of the group were exposed to it. Even without such
knowledge, we might quarantine anyone who tests positive. If only 1 in
1000 has the disease, then we should expect quarantine to inconvenience
50 healthy people. However, this would contain the disease, and it would
certainly be better than inconveniencing 999 healthy people as we would
if we quarantined potential victims without testing. So, the test may still
be a useful thing. It may also be that we have superior but more expensive
tests. We could then save money by testing only 51 people rather than
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all 1000 with the expensive test. Also, we know that infected people will
ultimately eventually break out with symptoms, giving us an independent
way of checking to see if a positive result was a false positive.
The realist will be hard-pressed to save the success-to-truth inference
in these ways. Selecting successful theories may increase the probability
that we will have a true one, just as quarantining people who test positive
increases the proportion of people under consideration who have the
disease from 1 in 1000 to 1 in 51. Success of course is a good thing. Yet
the true theories will not break out with any other symptoms—they will
merely continue to be true. Nor are there further tests. This is a crucial
point. The realist gambit is in a way posing further tests and looking for
symptoms of a theory’s truth. For example, they look for empirically
successful theories that ‘break out’ with novel predictions, maturity, unification, etc. Granting realist claims, whittling down the pool like this
will increase the positive probability shift. Settle on a definition of success, though, and we still need to know base rates; unless we know them,
these shifts are useless for helping advance the no-miracles argument. The
realist is faced with a dilemma: Either there is a way of knowing the
approximate base rate of truth among our current theories or there is not.
If there is, then we must have some independent grounds for thinking that
a theory is very likely true; yet if we had such grounds, the no-miracles
argument would be superfluous. If there is not, then the no-miracles
argument requires an assumption that some significant proportion of
our current theories are true; yet that would beg the question against the
anti-realist.
Anti-realists, meanwhile, can keep finding successful false theories. By
finding more and more of them, they can eventually drive the realist to
make a choice between giving up the reliability of the success-to-truth
inference and making the base rate of true theories very low. If Laudan
found hundreds and hundreds of successful but false theories, this ought
to make the realist squirm a bit. Even so, as reflection on the above
numbers shows, realists can always find a value of the base rate that suits
their purposes. More importantly, given the tremendous controversy over
merely a handful of cases (aether, phlogiston, the wave theory of light,
caloric, etc.), it is unlikely that a sufficient number of uncontroversial
successful-but-false theories would ever be found to even slightly nudge a
realist cognizant of the base rate fallacy.
Of course, if the base rates are interpreted as prior probabilities in a
subjective Bayesian framework, the problem can be avoided. If some interval of values can be deemed the subjectively ‘reasonable’ priors, then—
as Dorling (1992) shows—the Bayesian can be a realist or an anti-realist.
Given certain priors and evidence, Bayesians will be committed to realism
about particular entities; given other priors, Bayesians will be committed to
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anti-realism. But notice that these are retail arguments about particular
entities. In Dorling’s cases, there may well be some plausible set of priors
available, priors that realists and anti-realists could have agreed on before
all the evidence came in. In the present wholesale case, however, where the
entire fate of realism or anti-realism seems bound up with the priors, we
can’t imagine how one could find a reasonable set of priors.
Nor can we imagine how one could find the objective ratio of true
theories among all past theories. We might admit that in principle there is
such a ratio, but there is in practice no way to ascertain it. And if there were,
there would then be no need to make either argument in the first place.
6. Doing Justice to Intuitions. The fallaciousness of the no-miracles
argument and the pessimistic induction may come as no surprise. Worrall
suggests that they might better be called ‘‘considerations’’ for and against
realism. Although not valid arguments, they reveal a deep realist intuition
and a deep anti-realist intuition (Worrall 1989, 101).7 What do the considerations amount to? Well, any story about science and its history had
better allow for the fact that sometimes scientists have thought highly of
theories that later turned out false; and any story about science had better
reflect the fact that science sometimes makes very detailed predictions
that are confirmed with beautiful precision.
Yet one may feel an urge to say more than this. Even after the exposure
of the fallacy, the two ‘arguments’ may still prime us to feel realist or antirealist impulses. Whether we should acknowledge these impulses as
probative intuitions is another matter.
One may object: ‘There must be something wrong with the foregoing
discussion! Debates that so many smart people have taken seriously can’t
be predicated on such an elementary fallacy.’ Yet there is evidence that
people are prone to commit the false positives fallacy. Psychologists have
been aware of the phenomenon at least since Meehl and Rosen’s classic
paper (1955), and it has been demonstrated experimentally by Tversky
and Kahneman (1982) and others following after them. It is not confined to
the psychologist’s subject of choice, the college undergraduate; Casscells,
et al. (1978) demonstrate its prevalence among physicians. There is no
reason to expect that philosophers would be immune.
The propensity to commit this fallacy explains why these two ‘considerations’ have rhetorical force even after their logical force has been
shown lacking. Just as we are susceptible to optical illusions after we
understand them for what they are, we may continue to be susceptible to
these logical illusions. We should not try to do justice to the intuitions,
7. In response to the tension between these two, he suggests structural realism as a position
that might sit well with both.
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except in the sense that the court may do justice to a killer. This diagnosis,
if it is correct, means that the major considerations for and against realism
come to naught.
We have argued so far that the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are instances of the same fallacy, that research suggests
that educated people are apt to commit this fallacy, and thus that the
intuitive appeal of the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction
should not be taken as a sign that they have any probative force. This does
not entail that there is no issue between realism and anti-realism. Nevertheless, one wonders what debates about realism would be like without
appeals to either of these attractive but fallacious arguments. We return to
this train of thought in Section 8.
7. Reformulations. Following Howson and Lewis, we’ve formulated
both arguments as statistical inferences of a particular kind. Perhaps the
point is merely an artifact of a deficient formulation of the argument?
The no-miracles argument might be reconstructed as a likelihood inference (cf. Sober 1990). As we’ve already noted, this could provide some
incremental confirmation of a theory’s truth. That is, learning that a theory
is successful gives us a reason to revise upwards the probability that it is
true. Nevertheless, nothing guarantees that the resulting probability will
be high enough to merit belief. Recall the hypothetical disease: The
probability that an arbitrary person has the disease is .001; testing positive
shifts this upward to .02. Yet the realist seems to think that the probability
of the truth of theories is close to 1 or at least that it’s greater than .5. An
argument purely in terms of likelihoods cannot secure this conclusion.
The realist might object that the no-miracles argument is not fallacious
when supplemented with an appropriate auxiliary assumption. As argued
above, however, suitable assumptions (e.g., that there is a significant
proportion of true theories in H) either beg the question or render the nomiracles argument redundant. The realist is still free to suggest that the
supplemented no-miracles argument is valid and that he the realist thinks
it is sound. It then joins inductive defenses of induction and abductive
defenses of inference to the best explanation. Here we enter murky waters
and cannot do justice to the subtleties of the discussion in the literature
(see Howson 2000, chap. 10; Lipton 1994; Psillos 1999).
It might be better to reconstruct the argument such that the chances and
miracles are not expressed as probabilities.8 It is common to say that the
no-miracles argument is not a probabilistic argument at all, but instead an
inference to the best explanation (IBE). Critics of IBE complain that the
8. As Howson points out (and we agree), it is doubtful that there are really well-defined
sample spaces and probability distributions over the space of all theories anyway.
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argument is viciously circular—anti-realists doubt that IBE is in fact a
reliable inferential method, so it can’t be used to defend realism. Defenders of the argument respond that there is ‘good’ circular and ‘bad’
circular, that if the argument is only as bad as deductive defenses of
deductions it is not so bad. The upshot of these debates seems to be that
defenders of IBE view the IBE no-miracles argument as having the
rhetorical force to make the hearer believe what the hearer believes.
Perhaps, as Lipton (1994) argues, these ‘sermons to the choir’ have a
legitimate purpose, but they cannot settle debates over realism.9 As such,
we do not see how the no-miracles argument can be meaningfully saved
by another formulation.
What about the pessimistic induction? One might defend it as a classical statistical inference: If the theories are drawn at random from the
history of science, then we may infer from the theories sampled to the
population of all scientific theories. The question, of course, is whether
it’s appropriate to think of scientific theories as balls in an urn. For a
classical statistical inference, the draws from the urn must be independent
and identically-distributed. Cases offered for the pessimistic induction are
not drawn in this way, since they all come from the past. This is analogous to pouring half of the balls from the original urn into a second urn
and taking random draws only from this second urn. It will only be
legitimate to generalize from the second urn to the original urn if the
distribution of balls in the second urn is the same as the distribution in the
original. The analogous assumption in the historical case is that the distribution of true theories in the past is the same is the distribution of true
theories in the present and future—that is, it is just the contested assumption about base rates. So we don’t see how even a completely random sampling of past theories could resolve the problem.
We can imagine IBE formulations of the pessimistic induction: the
absence of any robust connection between success and truth might be
offered as the best explanation for the eventual failure of past successful
theories. This is a tantalizing suggestion. We leave it undeveloped, since
we doubt that any anti-realists would be charmed by such a schizophrenic
defense of anti-realism in the first place.
Perhaps there is some formulation of one or the other argument that
escapes these worries. We note simply that the obvious formulations do
not. Consider, then, a realist who finds realism appealing because of a pretheoretic intuition that the success of science could not be a miracle. Is it
9. Psillos (1999) defends a version of the no-miracles argument that presumes realism and
then aims to show that IBE is reliable. We have no immediate quarrel with such an approach,
since it grants what we hope to demonstrate—viz. that the no-miracles argument fails as a
probative argument for realism.
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plausible to think that her intuition harkens to some elusive formulation of
the argument? Isn’t it more plausible to think that she has the obvious
version of the argument in mind, especially since the fallacy in the obvious version is one that even educated people are prone to commit? The
same holds for an anti-realist who finds anti-realism appealing on account
of the history of science. Since he has a psychological propensity to
neglect base rates in a way that would make the obvious version of the
argument convincing for him, then why think his intuitions anticipate
some as-yet-undiscovered argument?
8. Imagining a Future. Imagine, if you will, what the literature on scientific realism would be like if we set aside no-miracles arguments and
pessimistic inductions. As we mentioned at the outset, the no-miracles
arguments and pessimistic induction are wholesale arguments, in that the
conclusions are supposed to hold for all (or most) of the theories of our
present, mature sciences. If we eschew these two arguments, we might
look for some other wholesale motivation to settle realism debates en
masse or instead for retail arguments that resolve questions only about
particular kinds or individuals.
8.1. Other Wholesale Arguments. The underdetermination of theory by
evidence, as it is often construed, is a wholesale argument for anti-realism
about unobservable entities. Every theory has empirically equivalent rivals, we are told, and there is no epistemic distinction to be made between
empirically equivalent theories. This is not a statistical argument, since
we are promised that not just most but all theories have empirically
equivalent rivals. Thus, there is no population under consideration and
there are no base rates to neglect.
Yet, anyone hoping to exploit underdetermination in this way faces a
dilemma. First horn: The underdetermination should not be too sweeping.
Since the anti-realist has no better answer to the problem of induction
than the realist has got, underdetermination threatens to sweep away
predictions about observables just as it sweeps away claims about unobservables. That way lies scepticism. Second horn: The underdeterminaton
must be sweeping enough that the details of particular cases will not
obviate it. In contemporary quantum physics, for instance, there are several theories which are (plausibly) underdetermined with respect to one
another. Nevertheless, as Cordero argues, the common ground between
these several theories ‘‘does manage to tell us a great deal about what
actually exists and what it is like’’ (2001, S310). Some modest realism
would be justified in this case, so putatively wholesale underdetermination
would give way to retail evaluation of particular scientific episodes. The
dilemma for wholesale underdetermination arguments, then, is how to find
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underdetermination strong enough to apply without reference to particulars but not so strong as to yield scepticism.10
The conjunction argument is another wholesale consideration that does
not rely on neglecting base rates. When chemists tell us that an object is
‘negatively charged,’ we expect that object to act according to electrostatic laws governing things that are ‘negatively charged.’ If we were to
consider only the empirical parts of each model, such prediction would be
illegitimate. We thus derive a predication from the chemical and physical
theories taken together, considering not only unobservable parts of the
theories but also assuming that a shared phrase (‘negatively charged’) has
the same meaning in each theory.11
Yet, it’s not always appropriate to apply the conjunction of our best
scientific theories. This is most obvious when our best accounts in different domains are logically inconsistent; for instance, the spacetime metric being dynamical in general relativity and non-dynamical in quantum
theory (see Callender and Huggett 2001). Some conjunctions are appropriate and others aren’t. Attending to when conjunction is good practice
and when it is not demands attending to the details of specific cases. It
may deliver realism about some entities, but it would mean abandoning
hopes for a wholesale answer to the question of scientific realism.12
There may yet be other wholesale arguments waiting in the wings, and
our arguments against underdetermination and conjunction qua wholesale
arguments have been necessarily brief. Regardless, its worth imagining
what sort of realism or anti-realism would survive if it were secured
without the no-miracles argument or pessimistic induction. Without these,
we lose the rationale for both entity realism and structural realism, two
accounts that struggle to sharply divide theoretical structures from entities
posited by the theory.
8.2. Retail Arguments. Nothing said here dooms retail arguments for or
against realism. There may be good reasons to be a realist about neutrinos,
an anti-realist about top quarks, and so on. Indeed, it would have been a

10. One of us has dealt with the question of underdetermination in considerable detail
elsewhere (Magnus 2003a).
11. For one version of the argument, see Boyd 1982. There are objections to the conjunction
argument, as in van Fraassen 1980, but it interests us here merely as a putatively wholesale
argument.
12. In recent work, Philip Kitcher deploys an argument form he calls the Galilean Strategy
to underwrite realism (2001a; 2001b, chap. 2). As one of us has argued elsewhere, however,
the Galilean Strategy leads to realism about some particular kinds but fails to underwrite the
inference from success to truth (Magnus 2003b); as we now put the point, the Galilean
Strategy succeeds as a retail argument form but fails as a wholesale argument for realism.
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surprise if base rates were neglected in all the arguments marshaled for and
against the reality of particular entities or structures. Return to the case of
our imagined disease, and ask if we should be realists about the disease
even when it is incubating but yet to show symptoms. As noted above, we
may sometimes know the base rate of the disease in a population by
independent means. Moreover, we might be able to identify the diseasecausing pathogen under a microscope. This would provide an argument for
realism that is not statistical and, hence, does not implicate base rates in
any obvious way.
We therefore have at least one clear way of distinguishing profitable
realism debates from unprofitable ones. Profitable ones will either not be
sweeping statistical arguments or, if they are statistical arguments, will be
such that the base rates can be determined through independent means.
Consider some classic examples. The debate over the reality of atoms at
the turn of the twentieth century was one of huge significance in science.
This was not a general statistical argument. No one used (say) ‘most
atomistic theories turn out to be true’ as an argument for atomism. With
argument and experiment it was thus possible for the most forceful opponent of atomism, Planck, to change his mind and be committed to
atomism. With the debate among caloric theory, the wave theory of heat,
and the dynamical theory it was the same. The arguments were nonstatistical. Here again it was possible for a notable defender of caloric,
Thompson, to completely change his mind due to theoretical and experimental arguments.13
Of course, there are also statistical arguments made in realism debates,
especially in debates in high energy particle physics. Base rates may well
be used. In any retail case, however, there will in general be independent
handles on determining these base rates. Consider for instance the discovery of the W particle, the charged intermediate vector boson
needed by the Weinberg-Salam theory of electroweak interactions. Observed events matched what was predicted by theory: the mass, type of
momentum, and lack of particle jets. But how do we know that these
events were not background effects pretending to look like these candidate effects? It is possible that this happened, and one might worry that if
the base rate of such mimicking events is high then we can’t state with
confidence that we have likely found the W particle. The key here is to
understand that there are independent theories of many other particles,
collisions, etc., each of these independently tested, that in fact provide
13. Within some theories of confirmation (e.g. Bayesianism), a retail inference from confirming evidence to theory is treated in terms of probabilities—and so problems of base rates
might arise. Wholesale arguments need to address populations of theories, however, so they
invite statistical considerations—and so problems with base rates do arise.
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independent predictions of the probabilities of such background effects
(see Franklin 1986). Here is a case where we do need to know various
base rates to corroborate our theory, but these base rates are obtainable. In
general, science proceeds with a variety of methods at independently
estimating crucial base rates, e.g., using a variety of instruments, experimental checks and calibration, eliminating alternative explanations, etc.
One may object that these independent theories themselves require
base rates, the theories corroborating these base rates require base rates,
and so on. In other words, maybe there is no way of breaking out of the
circle involving base rates. We see no particular reason to believe that this
is the case. If it is and the circle is wide enough, however, then this claim
begins to sound like merely a restatement of the problem of general
scepticism—not something we are concerned to tackle here.
One may also object:14 ‘Retail arguments rely on general assumptions
that can be used to construct a wholesale argument. You agree that in the
early twentieth century it was appropriate to believe in the existence of
atoms for all the usual reasons. Let F be whatever features of the situation
at the time made it reasonable to believe in atoms. There is then a
wholesale argument that, whenever F obtains, one should believe in (say)
the principle theoretical posits and entities of the relevant science.’
We believe this objection would have us reprise a standard debate in
epistemology, namely, the problem of the criterion (Chisholm 2003). How
do we know which beliefs are justified? Do we have a criterion, like
Descartes’ clarity and distinctness, and then see which particular beliefs
satisfy this criterion? Or do we begin with particular beliefs we know to
be justified, like Moore, and then generalize from them? Retail arguments
turn on particularism in the present context. We acknowledge that it may
be possible to get a kind of wholesale argument by discovering something
in common among all good retail arguments for realism. Without trying
to settle the larger epistemological issue, we offer a note of caution. Reflecting on the vast complexities of various historical episodes in science,
there is no reason to think that the general assumptions one finds will
be at all simple, natural, or even non-disjunctive; in short, there is no
guarantee that the criterion one finds will be either interesting or useful.
So although it is logically possible to turn a retail argument into a kind of
wholesale argument, the resulting wholesale argument may appeal to
‘general assumptions’ that are long, gruesome, and can do none of the
heavy lifting that wholesale arguments are usually meant to do.
Perhaps philosophers inclined to dissolve debates over realism will be
no happier with retail arguments than they were with wholesale arguments.
Fine, for instance, rejects what he calls piecemeal realism. He decries
14. We owe this interesting objection to an anonymous referee.
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realists’ attempts ‘‘to relocate the school to where conditions seem optimal
for its defense, and then to insinuate that the case for such a ‘piecemeal
realism’ could be made elsewhere too, were there but world enough and
time’’ (1991, 79). Fine describes a plausible stratagem for a realist who
sees the value of retail arguments but has a hidden yen for wholesale
conclusions. Yet licensing the move from a collection of realist cases to
conclusions about all or most of science requires an implicit statistical
argument that the cases are representative. Such statistical arguments are
doomed.
What Fine calls piecemeal realism is thus only an ersatz retail argument; the particular case is offered as a proxy for all of science. As Fine
sees it, the piecemeal strategy is motivated by the opposition between the
no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction (1991, 81–84). We
have argued that these opposing wholesale arguments should be set aside.
We should pay attention to particular cases for their own sake and not as
proxies for something else.15
9. Conclusion. We can now answer the question with which we began.
The question of why scientific methods succeed is, in a sense, just as
legitimate as the question of why silver fishing lures succeed in catching
fish. There is nothing wrong with the philosopher wanting an answer to
the broader question. Because one can imagine a full continuum of cases
where base rates are knowable to a varying degree, one can see that the
distinction between wholesale and retail is a matter of degree and not
kind. We concede that there is no sharp distinction between the wholesale
and the retail. Nevertheless, good retail arguments for realism are on one
side of the spectrum and wholesale arguments occupy an extreme position
on the other side. The lunge for totality in wholesale arguments suggests
that they will need statistical considerations about all or most theories and
also that there will not be any independent methods for estimating the
relevant base rate. Without independent methods for estimating crucial
base rates, there is little to do but make arguments that beg the question.
Wholesale realism debates persist not due to mere stubbornness, but because there is no reason for opponents to agree. The more modest reach of
the narrower retail question allows for arguments that are non-statistical or
for broad agreement in estimating base rates. These debates are profitable
because there is reason to agree.
We suggest that the great hope for realism and anti-realism lies in retail
arguments that attend to the details of particular cases. It is unlikely that
15. As a matter of terminology, there is some small reason to prefer ‘retail’ to ‘piecemeal.’
Retail arguments naturally contrast with wholesale arguments, but piecemeal realism has no
such natural contrast. (Whole hog realism?)

realist ennui

337

either side will win every argument; it seems more likely that realism and
anti-realism are options to be exercised sometimes here and sometimes
there.16 This equivocal victory for each might be uncomfortable for
realists and anti-realists alike, but so be it.
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